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The use of trade promotions as a channel-programming
tool has increased substantially in the past decade. In fo-
cusing on the tactical implications of trade promotions,
some firms appear to have underestimated the tendency of
poorly planned trade promotions to interfere with the im-
plementation of a marketing strategy. In this article, the
authors examine the complex issue of trade promotion use
from both long-term and short-term perspectives. Differ-
ent trade promotions can produce dissimilar types of chan-
nel cooperation, consumer responses, and postpromotion
channel member behavior, resulting in differences in
distribution-programming preferences between suppliers
and retailers. The authors argue that the adjudication of
these different preference structures is addressed through
the market power of the channel participants. Based on an
assessment of these channel relationships, an approach
for suggested courses of action is forwarded.
Trade promotions are nonroutine marketing induce-
ments designed to influence channel partner behavior (cf.
Blattberg and Neslin 1990; Van Waterschoot and Van den
Bulte 1992; Zerrillo and Iacobucci 1995). They are used to
encourage channel coordination by directing incentives to
expand or maintain distribution, gain merchandising sup-
port, and/or affect inventories. Their use has the effect of
shifting channel profits among members and/or stimulat-
ing selective consumer demand.
Trade promotions have become an increasingly impor-
tant distribution-programming variable for retailers and
suppliers. For example, as a percentage of total promo-
tional expenditures, trade promotions for packaged goods
have grown from 38 percent in 1985 to approximately 50
percent in the mid-1990s (Cox Direct 1997; Tenser 1996).
For retailers, trade promotions provide needed marketing
support and increased contributions to profits. Speer
(1994) reports that some retailers operating on slim mar-
gins rely on trade promotions for 20 to 40 percent of their
net profits. For suppliers, trade promotions are used to sup-
port distribution and performance objectives. For exam-
ple, 70 to 90 percent of grocery items shipped are on deal
(Zerrillo and Iacobucci 1995).
Ample evidence shows that trade promotions have
underachieved in accomplishing channel objectives.
Trade promotions have had little impact on a company’s
underlying baseline sales volume (cf. Davis, Inman, and
McAlister 1992; Ehrenberg, Hammond, and Goodhardt
1994; Lucas 1996), and some say that their long-term
implications are likely to be negative (cf. Mela, Gupta, and
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Lehmann 1996; Zerrillo and Iacobucci 1995). Even from a
short-term perspective, trade promotions may be suspect.
For example, only 10 to 20 percent of grocery promotions
are profitable events (Orgel 1996). Moreover, if a supplier
is caught in a regular cycle of repetitive trade promotion
incentives, retailers become conditioned to expect these
inducements. This pattern increases the level of trade pro-
motion programming expected for channel cooperation
and makes trade promotions difficult to terminate or even
manage (Van Waterschoot and Van den Bulte 1992; Zer-
rillo and Iacobucci 1995).
In this article, we identify market power as a conceptual
basis for the study and development of trade promotion
policies and programs. We build on the work of others who
also have commented on the difficulties inherent in creat-
ing coherent trade promotional programs (cf. Buzzell et al.
1987; DeNitto 1994; Farris and Quelch 1987; “Future
Vision” 1994; Jones, K. 1989; Jones, J. 1990; Quelch, Nes-
lin, and Olson 1987; Walters 1989, 1991). First, we discuss
the role of trade promotions in marketing strategy. Next,
we provide a managerial framework for trade promotions
in the context of market power. We conclude with a set of
normative propositions for the use of trade promotions
within different channel scenarios. Our goal is to provide
guidance to both suppliers and retailers in the rationaliza-
tion of trade promotion programs consistent with their
respective market positions in the channel.
THE ROLE OF TRADE PROMOTIONS
IN MARKETING STRATEGY
The fundamental goal of trade promotions is to stimu-
late retailer behavior that promotes customer demand.
Both retailers and suppliers should be interested in the effi-
cient application of trade promotion tools to strategically
build image, brand equity, and consumer loyalty (Sinnott
1995). Channel efficiency improves channel competitive-
ness and strengthens channel partners. Inappropriate trade
promotion efforts can be dysfunctional. Careful planning
and implementation require an understanding of the role of
trade promotions in the context of marketing strategy and
the conditions that promote effectiveness.
Trade promotions are usually discussed as part of the
sales promotion element of an integrated marketing com-
munications strategy consisting of advertising, personal
selling, publicity, and sales promotions (cf. Kotler 1997,
Rossiter and Percy 1997). The elements should be
designed to work in unison to accomplish objectives with
the role of each being dependent on how it makes the great-
est contribution to the supplier’s marketing strategy. Van
Waterschoot and Van de Bulte (1992) provide additional
insight by making a distinction between sales promotions
(consumer and trade promotions) and the core marketing
mix. Sales promotions are supplemental inducements that
amplify the firm’s product, price, distribution, and com-
munication strategies by complementing these activities
on a nonroutine or “as need be” basis to accomplish objec-
tives. Thus, sales promotions should depend on and aug-
ment a fundamentally sound marketing mix.
While we acknowledge the close association between
trade promotions, consumer promotions, and the market-
ing mix, we confine our analysis to trade promotions
because of the complexity, importance, and underachieve-
ment of trade promotions. We contend that trade promo-
tion expenditures should be allocated according to the
relative value of a particular supplier to a retailer. The less
attractive the supplier is to the retailer (i.e., the weaker it is
perceived relative to other suppliers), the greater the need
for trade promotions to supplement the supplier’s market-
ing mix to obtain retailer cooperation. Moreover, less
attractive suppliers have fewer degrees of freedom in
devising distribution programming, and the level of
inducement necessary to obtain cooperation tends to
increase.
LINKING POWER TO TRADE
PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES
The impact of trade promotions differs by the type
used and the characteristics of the channel partners. Mar-
ket power is a construct that provides a framework that
helps to match trade promotion options with channel ob-
jectives. El-Ansary and Stern (1972) define channel
power as follows:
The power of a channel member is its ability to con-
trol the decision variables in the marketing strategy
of another member in a given channel at a different
level of distribution. For this control to qualify as
power, it should be different from the influenced
member’s original level of control over its own mar-
keting strategy. (P. 47)
Using trade promotions to garner shelf space, promo-
tional support, or quantity purchases from the retailer are
manifestations of channel power in that the supplier al-
tered the retailer’s behavior. Similarly, requiring the sup-
plier to pay slotting allowances for retail shelf space
alters supplier behavior. The use of power usually does
not mean coercion or contentious behavior but rather en-
ticements, persuasion, association, and so forth to gain
the desired outcomes.
The successful exercise of power requires an accurate
determination of the limits of power and a successful
implementation within these limits. Mutual understanding
and acceptance of relative channel member power posi-
tions generally minimize conflict and should produce
more effective channel activities in the long run (cf.
Anderson and Weitz 1992; Ganesan 1993; Scheer and
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Stern 1992). Beyond current interactions, the outcomes
from the use of power affect the future determinants of
power. For example, expenditures on advertising aimed at
building brand loyalty enhance the supplier’s position,
while a diversion of money from franchise building to tem-
porary deals such as trade discounts may not.
Figure 1 illustrates the interconnectedness of the ori-
gins of channel power, trade promotions, and outcomes.
The underlying premise is that a manufacturer’s discretion
in trade activities is a function of the relative power in its
channel relationships, that outcomes differ depending on
the trade promotion used, and, accordingly, that they can
affect the determinants of power for the future.
Market Power
Trade promotions can best be understood as part of an
overall channel management strategy based on accurate
perceptions of both market power and the relative power of
the channel participants. We define market power as the
strength of a supplier relative to competing suppliers and a
retailer relative to competing retailers. On the other hand,
relative power is determined by the comparison of market
power among trading partners in a channel dyad.
Retailers seek suppliers and suppliers seek retailers
with high market power because powerful channel part-
ners can assist them in accomplishing their strategic goals.
The strength of a channel member’s customer franchise is
one characteristic that influences the design of trade pro-
motion programs (Quelch 1989). In other words, retailers
and suppliers favor channel relationships and programs
with trading partners that have loyal customers. Retailers
also favor suppliers that offer a product with a distinctive
brand image in product categories of importance for the
retailer’s strategy and suppliers that can be expected to
provide strong distribution, promotional support, and
other value-added services. Similarly, suppliers also favor
retailers that offer distinctive store images in retail formats
of importance for the supplier’s strategy and retailers that
can be expected to provide strong merchandising, promo-
tional support, and other value-added services.
The attractiveness of a channel member is reflected in
the importance of its valued resources and the degree to
which they are available from other sources. The extent of
the motivational investment in a channel relationship
reflects an overall assessment of the rewards and costs of
an association (comparison level) against those available
from other sources (comparison levels of alternatives) (cf.
Anderson and Narus 1984; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987;
Kasulis, Spekman, and Bagozzi 1978; Thibaut and Kelley
1959). Thus, a supplier’s attractiveness as a channel part-
ner is derived from the supplier’s horizontal strength, that
is, its valued resources in relation to other suppliers. Hori-
zontal strength is a reflection of market power. A retailer’s
attractiveness comes from its horizontal strength, that is,
its valued resources in relation to alternative retailers. The
comparison of a supplier’s horizontal strength vis-à-vis
the retailer’s horizontal strength determines the balance of
power in the dyadic relationship.
For the supplier, power is derived from (1) brand dis-
tinctiveness—differentiation of its brand image from
those of competitors; (2) consumer loyalty—customer
preference for its brand; (3) competitive position—value-
added capabilities such as advertising support, merchan-
dising expertise, and cost-saving programs like efficient
consumer response; and (4) category importance—impor-
tance of the product category in the retailer’s strategy.
Similarly, retailer power is derived from (1) outlet distinct-
iveness—differentiation of the outlet image from those of
competitors; (2) consumer loyalty—customer preference
for its outlet; (3) competitive position—value-added capa-
bilities such as advertising support, merchandising exper-
tise, and cooperativeness with suppliers; and (4) category
importance—importance of the retail format to the sup-
plier’s strategy. These horizontal comparisons of scarce
resources serve as determinants of a channel member’s
ability to successfully influence behavior vertically within
the channel (Buchanan 1992; Farris and Ailawadi 1992;
Keith, Jackson, and Crosby 1990). The weaker the sup-
plier, the larger the inducement needed to gain retailer
cooperation. Thus, greater power means more degrees of
freedom in the choice of action.
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Outcomes From Exercising Power
Empirical research shows that the way power is applied
affects the character of the outcomes (cf. Anderson and
Narus 1984, 1990; Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, and Simp-
son 1992; Dwyer et al. 1987; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989;
Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier and Summers 1984; Keith
et al. 1990). In a conceptual article, Frazier and Sheth
(1985) emphasize the importance of obtaining both behav-
ior and attitude outcomes from a distribution program.
Kasulis and Spekman (1980) offer a philosophically con-
sistent perspective based on Kelman’s (1961) three conse-
quences of an influence attempt. They group power
outcomes into three categories based on how power is ex-
ercised. The outcomes from the use of power were catego-
rized as the following:
1. compliance or short-term behavioral acquies-
cence,
2. identification or cooperation only within the
context of direct association, and
3. internalization or long-term cooperation
through the alignment of common goals (behav-
ior and attitude consistency).
Figure 2 defines 13 commonly used trade promotion
vehicles and illustrates their connection with the retailer’s
motivation to participate. The first 4 trade promotions are
price inducements designed to increase the economic
value for the retailer through increased margins and/or
turnover. Trade promotions 5 and 6 are distribution in-
ducements designed to increase the availability of the sup-
plier’s offering by temporarily increasing retailer margins.
Next are 3 promotional inducements formulated to obtain
greater retailer support in building selective demand
through retailer merchandising and communications. The
10th and 11th trade promotion inducements seek to moti-
vate individual retailer employees to better “push” the sup-
plier’s offering. Finally, the last 2 trade promotions
attempt to improve the effectiveness of the push efforts,
thereby increasing demand for the supplier’s offering.
The trade promotions listed at the top of Figure 2 reflect
short-term margin reallocations within the channel. While
these promotions may affect a supplier’s access to retail
shelf space, they may not lead to an increase in consumer
preference for either the supplier’s brand or the retailer’s
overall offering. At the bottom of Figure 2 are trade pro-
motions that emphasize building selective demand. These
latter trade promotions tend to foster more of a partnering
relationship between channel members, resulting in a
residual effect beyond the promotion period. Moreover,
they develop the supplier’s future horizontal strength.
Supplier and retailer goals are frequently at odds. Sup-
pliers prefer distribution programming that increases the
selective demand for their product while maintaining
supplier margins. Conceptually, trade promotion induce-
ments are designed to compensate the retailer for cooper-
ating to meet this goal. The trade promotions toward the
bottom of Figure 2 are better suited for suppliers’ objec-
tives. On the other hand, retailers seek the greatest return
for their valued shelf space in terms of the margins and
turnover of the merchandise that they carry. While the
retailer can only speculate about the impact on its profit-
ability from its efforts to promote selective demand for the
supplier’s product, increased margins are an immediate
concrete benefit and therefore tend to be preferred. Thus,
the trade promotions toward the top of Figure 2 appear to
be better suited for retailer interests.
The orientation of many large retailers is slowly evolv-
ing from an individual product perspective toward a cate-
gory management outlook. A category management per-
spective focuses on product categories as strategic
business units with category goals for sales and profits (cf.
Kahn and McAlister 1997; McLaughlin and Hawkes
1994). The category management perspective makes the
trade promotion participation decision more complex than
a mere SKU analysis. Instead of focusing on performance
of an individual product, suppliers attempting to change
retailer behavior through trade promotions must fashion
programs that improve the overall performance of an
entire retail category. Therefore, category management
changes, but does not eliminate, the need for and useful-
ness of trade promotions.
Whether dealing with traditional or category manage-
ment retailer perspectives, the ability of the supplier to
receive a favorable response from the retailer is a function
of the supplier’s attractiveness (market power), the magni-
tude of the inducement, and the retailer’s marketing strat-
egy. The magnitude of the trade promotion inducement
and the supplier’s attractiveness as reflected in its brand
distinctiveness, consumer loyalty, competitive position,
and category importance affect the retailer’s trade promo-
tion participation decision. The characteristics of each
trade promotion in Figure 2 are explained in greater detail
below.
Compliance. Compliance-oriented trade promotions
tend to produce temporary behavior change without attitu-
dinal change. These trade promotions can be divided
into two groups: binding and nonbinding. Binding
compliance-oriented trade promotions obligate retailers to
specific behaviors via a carefully delineated contract.
Nonbinding promotions offer incentives without the force
of a legally binding agreement about the retailer’s respon-
sibilities. Street money, free goods, and discounts are non-
binding compliance-oriented trade promotions. At best,
they stimulate favorable retailer response for only as long
as the promotion period and potentially hurt future sales if
consumers stock up on the promoted item. Moreover, if the
inducements become excessively routinized, retailers and
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consumers may postpone purchases with the expectation
that a deal will be forthcoming.
The retailer presumably will pass all or a substantial
portion of the incentives onto consumers as discounts or
use the inducements for promotional efforts that stimulate
demand. However, in practice, only 35 to 49 percent of
manufacturer off-invoice promotion dollars are passed
along to consumers by retailers (Nielsen Marketing
Research 1988; Orgel 1996). Moreover, retailers have
been known to engage in excessive buying of deal mer-
chandise for sale in nondeal periods (forward buying) and
for sale in nondeal territories (diversion). These activities
have been shown to increase total channel costs and intra-
channel distrust (Buzzell, Quelch, and Salmon 1990). This
lack of cooperation increases retailer margins at the
expense of cultivating increased sales of the supplier’s
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product. Thus, channel profits are reallocated from the
supplier to the retailer during the deal period without much
benefit for the supplier.
The less attractive (in terms of horizontal strength) the
supplier is to the retailer, the less likely the retailer will
cooperate, even if it agrees to participate in the trade pro-
motion program. In situations in which behavior uncer-
tainty is high, agency theory prescribes explicit expecta-
tions of behavior as a self-selection device to remedy
potential opportunism (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992).
Because recourse against opportunism is limited, particu-
larly for products with intensive distribution strategies,
well-articulated expectations are important as an a priori
screening device that identifies likely noncooperative
retailers. Moreover, a written contract precisely specifying
obligations helps promote the desired channel behavior.
Perhaps more important than its legal enforcement mecha-
nism is a contract’s delineation of mutual expectations in
binding compliance-oriented trade promotions.
Even with appropriate screening efforts, the lack of atti-
tudinal commitment associated with compliance-oriented
trade promotions places great importance on monitoring.
Recognizing that a supplier cannot account for all contin-
gencies ex ante, transaction cost analysis theory addresses
unpredictability in behavior ex post through governance
structures (Wil l iamson 1989, 1996) . Binding
compliance-oriented trade promotions that have active
monitoring programs and compensation procedures based
on behavior are consistent with this philosophy. Bill-
backs/count-recounts, inventory financing, and slotting
allowances fit this description. Unlike nonbinding trade
promotions, these three promotions more precisely spec-
ify retailer behavior that potentially expands demand for
the supplier’s product. For example, while trade discounts
may be retained in dealer margins instead of being passed
on to the consumer, slotting allowances require increased
shelf space that should increase exposure and ultimately
demand. Similarly, inventory financing promotes avail-
ability and billback/count-recount promotions guarantee
consumer discounts by requiring verification of the dis-
counted sales before authorizing the trade promotion pay-
ment. Rebate plans for retailers are a variant of a bill-
back/count-recount trade promotion. Although rebate
plans are a fairly new concept in distribution program-
ming, Zerrillo and Iacobucci (1995) recommend their use
because they shift the cost of monitoring from the supplier
to the retailer, thereby reducing the cost of a trade deal as
well as increasing cooperation.
Identification. Trade promotions incorporating the
properties of identification are those that build on image,
reputation, unique abilities, and knowledge of the supplier
as perceived by the retailer. Calendar-marketing agree-
ments, display allowances, and cooperative advertis-
ing/comarketing programs use the image and reputation of
the supplier or require specialized advertising skills that
the supplier possesses. These trade promotions require
specified behavior that eventually should lead to expanded
demand for at least the period of the promotion. These
trade promotions can be productively coupled with dis-
counts that reinforce their appeal (cf. Gaski 1986).
Trade promotions that require the recipient to perform
additional value-added services tend to have effects that
last beyond the promotional period (Zerrillo and Iacobucci
1995). Effectively executed promotional inducements can
succeed in building retailer sales, thereby highlighting the
advantages of the supplier’s product and channel coopera-
tion. Moreover, the supplier’s brand equity and the retail-
er’s store equity become more closely associated when the
two collaborate on calendar-marketing agreements, dis-
plays, and cooperative advertising/comarketing programs.
While all supplier products carried by the retailer become
a component of the retailer’s image, to cooperate through
promotional efforts highlights these products within the
retailer’s image. In a sense, the supplier and retailer act
more like partners than buyers and sellers. This identifica-
tion may carry beyond the promotion period, thus encour-
aging longer lasting coordination. Zerrillo and Iacobucci
(1995) argue that the retailer’s selling experience, famili-
arity, and efficiency with the supplier’s product encourage
enduring relationships. Customer expectations of product
availability at the retailer also promote retailer identifica-
tion with the supplier.
A high level of monitoring is not necessary when the
retailer’s behavior is based on the desire to identify with an
attractive supplier. In such cases, the supplier’s a priori
screening has identified a retailer whose cooperation is
self-motivated. Part of the popularity of the relationship
marketing and category management concepts is that they
place greater emphasis on screening channel partners for a
cooperative orientation and on seeking “win-win” scenar-
ios. Trade promotions that are associated with identifica-
tion outcomes also fit a win-win description.
In contrast, if the retailer does not identify with a sup-
plier because of the latter’s weak market position, the
retailer may accept the promotional allowances without
fully committing to its implementation. Murry and Heide
(1998) report that noncooperation was common with dis-
play allowance programs. Thus, merely offering these
trade promotions does not ensure full cooperation—the
supplier must have the “clout” to foster retailer commit-
ment. In essence, retailer self-interests are not adequately
served by the level of the supplier’s attractiveness and the
magnitude of the trade promotion inducements. In situa-
tions of less attractive suppliers, extra efforts may be nec-
essary. To proceed otherwise reflects an inaccurate assess-
ment of the supplier’s market power. Unusually high
allowances, sales representatives with strong interpersonal
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attraction, and properly designed performance-based
compensation coupled with effective monitoring can
improve retailer cooperation (Murry and Heide 1998).
Internalization. Internalization is a term to describe the
congruity of retailer-supplier goals. Supplier-sponsored
contests and special promotional incentive factory funds
(SPIFFs) are two trade promotions that may be associated
with internalization. In this presentation, we are not refer-
ring to contests and SPIFFs directed to the retail firm—
they perform like compliance-oriented price promotions
in which there is a temporary reallocation of channel prof-
its. Instead, we are referring to contests, SPIFFs, and other
inducements for the retailer’s employees offered by the
supplier. These promotions reflect a more cooperative ar-
rangement that is associated with internalization because
they represent retailer comfort with direct-supplier influ-
ence on the retailer’s employees. Moreover, when properly
designed to nurture an attachment between the supplier
and the employees of the retailer, the resulting goodwill
can have a lasting effect (Burnett and Moriarty 1998).
Part of the residual effect may be due to the potential
training aspects of contests. Research on in-house sales
forces has shown that contests can offer residual benefits
beyond the incentive period if the sales force develops
habits and expertise that improves sales force quality
(Meredith and Fried 1977). Similarly, contests can moti-
vate reseller personnel to learn more about the supplier’s
product, thereby making the retailer’s employees more
effective and successful in selling the supplier’s product
(Sirgy 1998). The knowledge, comfort, and success
derived from selling the product during the contest period
are reinforcing to the relationship and should hold over
beyond the promotion period.
Missionary selling and in-store demonstrations also
result in a reseller internalization of the supplier’s goals.
By relinquishing some control of the retailer’s selling
function to the supplier and allowing the supplier the
opportunity for specialized attention, the retailer implic-
itly endorses the supplier’s offerings to consumers. Con-
sumers probably do not make a distinction about whose
employee is making the presentation, and even if they did,
the in-store presentation implies some level of retailer
endorsement. Consequently, the retailer’s cooperation
through missionary selling and in-store demonstrations
psychologically reinforces the notion that its own behavior
reflects a beneficial relationship. In attribution theory par-
lance, the retailer subconsciously attributes the cause of its
cooperation (behavior) to the desirability of the relation-
ship (cause). After all, the products that it sells and the peo-
ple interacting with its customers are an integral part of
how the consumer perceives the retailer’s image. There-
fore, the retailer should not risk damaging its image by
permitting in-store demonstrations or presentations for a
substandard product.
The supplier also is more likely to receive merchandis-
ing cooperation because missionary sales presentations
and in-store demonstrations build customer expectations
of availability. In this way, the supplier acquires greater
psychological legitimacy. In cases in which the product is
complicated or the marketing difficult, the supplier also
provides expertise for the retailer that helps sell the prod-
uct. Suppliers with merchandise expertise tend to receive
greater support for their programs (Murry and Heide
1998). Thus, the probable consequence of a missionary
sales presentation or in-store demonstration is a better
alignment of perspectives, resulting in a longer-term coop-
erative and coordinated relationship.
Contests, SPIFFs, missionary sales, and demonstra-
tions can result in attitude and behavior changes consistent
with supplier objectives. These trade promotions offer
win-win opportunities for the channel participants. Addi-
tional behavioral and psychological reinforcement efforts
to further cement the bonding of the relationship and the
internalization of common perspectives are also recom-
mended (Frazier and Sheth 1985). Through these actions,
long-term channel objectives are furthered.
RATIONALIZING TRADE PROMOTIONS
With complete freedom of action, suppliers should pre-
fer using trade promotions from the lower end of Figure 2
because they help build selective demand and a closer rela-
tionship with the retailer. However, the relative power of
the supplier and retailer affect the availability of options.
Figure 3 is an overview of four typical supplier-retailer
power relationships: dominant supplier, dominant retailer,
strong symmetric, and weak symmetric. The greater the
power imbalance within the dyad, the greater the latitude
of the more powerful member to prescribe trade promotion
activities.
Dominant Supplier Situation
A dominant supplier situation is one in which the sup-
plier holds greater market power relative to its retail part-
ner. As illustrated in Figure 1, a supplier’s market power
emanates from brand distinctiveness, consumer loyalty,
competitive position, and category importance compared
to similar retailer attributes. Therefore, the scope of power
is specific to the brand/model and line of trade. A large
nationwide supplier of an important product category for a
small local retailer illustrates the dominant supplier situa-
tion. For their stronger brands and models, Trek bicycles
holds such a position with locally owned bicycle specialty
stores, Procter & Gamble with independent supermarkets,
and Ford with smaller single-outlet car dealerships.
Because of its attractive market position, the supplier has
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greater flexibility in determining its marketing
programming.
Dominant suppliers build their customer franchises
through an effective marketing mix that includes strong
emphasis on direct-to-the-consumer communications,
such as advertising, loyalty programs, and sampling. Be-
cause retailers are inclined to participate in marketing pro-
grams with attractive suppliers, the supplier gains little
advantage from offering price and distribution induce-
ments (see Figure 2 for specific trade promotions). Trade
promotions should be viewed as supplemental to con-
sumer promotions and primarily directed at fostering cus-
tomer loyalty, which in turn yields greater profits and
increased channel attractiveness.
Proposition 1: A supplier in a dominant position should
minimize trade promotion activity.
When trade promotions are used, they should be part of
a supplier’s integrated marketing communications strat-
egy, complementing consumer promotions and advertis-
ing, that has the goal of building lasting preferences for its
brand. The extent to which a dominant supplier is inter-
ested in trade promotions at all is a function of the impor-
tance of the retail form to the marketing of the product
category. Lines of trade that have lower category impor-
tance for a supplier should attract little or no trade promo-
tion activity. For example, Procter & Gamble should not
devise trade promotions targeted to convenience stores for
Tide laundry detergent. Its focus should be on more impor-
tant lines of trade such as supermarkets and discount
stores. This saves limited resources for relationships that
offer more valued resources such as those found in strong
symmetric relationships. For these more important retail
forms, occasional cooperative advertising/comarketing
programs may be offered to reinforce the relationship
while promoting selective demand.
Mainly trading with small retailers. An exception to
Proposition 1 is the situation in which the supplier is al-
most exclusively associated with small independent retail-
ers. Paradoxically, suppliers in this situation appear
dominant in their dyadic relationships, yet they should de-
vote attention to these small independent retailers because
the supplier is solely dependent on their collective produc-
tivity. The supplier does not have the option of allocating
scarce resources to more attractive retailers. Essentially,
the category importance of the retailers increases because
of the supplier’s lack of options. We believe that the aggre-
gate impact of these retailers suggests that the best inter-
ests of the supplier are to more actively pursue
demand-stimulating trade incentives than suggested by
Proposition 1, although future research is needed to ad-
dress this question more definitively.
Under our assumption, both the promotional induce-
ments of display allowances and cooperative advertis-
ing/comarketing programs and the trade promotions
designed to motivate individual retail employees (contests
and SPIFFs) are cost-effective. In most cases, missionary
selling and demonstrations are not cost-effective because
of the large number of small-volume locations. Improving
the effectiveness of these activities might be addressed
through supplier-sponsored training programs at regional
locations.
Trade promotions offered by the dominant supplier
should be well received, and the magnitude of the incen-
tives need not be large due to the retailer’s desire to trade
with an attractive supplier. Moreover, the particular trade
promotions recommended have the added benefit of fos-
tering a cooperative atmosphere between the channel part-
ners. This cooperative atmosphere should continue even
after the trade promotion expires. These trade promotions
also further strengthen the supplier’s market power posi-
tion by building a stronger customer franchise.
Because of the cost of serving many small retailers,
consideration should be given to establishing thresholds of
performance. Apparently, Levi-Strauss and Fleming
Foods have come to this perspective in their trade relations
policies, although not specifically related to trade promo-
tions. Levi-Strauss has imposed minimum annual sales
thresholds of $10,000 for retailers who wish to carry Levi
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products (“Levi’s Letter to Small Stores” 1994). This pol-
icy locks out extremely small retailers who are in a weak
market position. Fleming Foods has initiated an alternative
approach. Fleming changed to activity cost pricing for its
services (Orgel 1995). Merchandise is sold at a base price,
and additional charges are imposed for services rendered.
Analogous threshold considerations should be established
in the design of trade promotions, consistent with
Robinson-Patman requirements that price differences are
allowed if they are based on differences in cost structures.
Other supplier considerations. A supplier strategy of
offering an everyday low purchase price (EDLPP) to re-
tailers may be an attractive alternative to heavy trade pro-
motion activity for the dominant supplier. EDLPP prices
merchandise to the retailer based on a weighted average of
deal and regular prices in proportion to the prior purchases
at each price level. It offers the prospect of smoothing the
production process and reducing inventory, warehousing,
and handling costs (Buzzell et al. 1990). While EDLPP at
the retailer to consumer level can lead to lower profits for
the retailer, EDLPP offers benefits to both the supplier and
retailer (Hoch, Dreze, and Purk 1994). Moreover, already
possessing a strong market position, dominant suppliers
have modest incentive to divert resources to trade promo-
tions. In addition, switching to EDLPP helps nationally
known brands compete more effectively with distributors’
brands. These private labels sell primarily on the basis of
lower price, and because they are the retailers’ products,
they are guaranteed shelf space. When national brands
move to EDLPP, additional consumer advertising can sup-
port them. This has been shown to “protect” them from re-
tailers’ labels (“Food Fundamentalism” 1993) as well as
offering a consistently better value to consumers.
Procter & Gamble has moved to a similar strategy. They
reduced prices by as much as 25 percent on more than
one-half of their products while decreasing trade promo-
tion expenditures (Schiller 1993). Procter & Gamble intro-
duced value pricing as a win-win option. Its own profit-
ability would improve through lower trade incentive costs
and lower standard margins, and retailers also would ulti-
mately benefit through reduced costs. Initially, many
retailers thought this was a “win-lose” situation and pub-
licly expressed their anger (DeNitto 1992; Johnson et al.
1992). Over time, the value of the value pricing approach
became more widely recognized.
Dominant Retailer Situation
A dominant retailer situation is one in which the retail-
er’s market power exceeds that of the supplier. A strong
national retailer and a small supplier exemplify the domi-
nant retailer scenario. Safeway Supermarkets trading with
regional dairies, Target Stores with local plant nurseries,
and Toys “R” Us with a small board game manufacturer
are examples of this situation.
Suppliers in this situation have limited flexibility in
their trade promotion strategy. Dominant retailers are
likely to be more restrictive in their shelf space allocations
and overall support of the subordinate supplier than with
more attractive suppliers. In these cases, the retailer is in a
powerful bargaining position to request concessions from
the supplier that increase the retailer’s direct product prof-
itability.
Proposition 2: A retailer in a dominant position should
favor supplier trade promotions that shift channel
profit from the supplier to the retailer.
Subordinate suppliers are caught in a difficult paradox.
Their weak relative power position suggests a need to
build a stronger consumer franchise through advertising,
consumer promotions, and other demand-stimulating ac-
tivities (Agrawal 1996), yet these resources need to be di-
verted to trade promotions that gain retailer participation.
This produces a negative relationship between the optimal
level of advertising and trade promotions for the supplier
(Neslin, Powell, and Stone 1995). Promotional incentives
would be desirable, but retailers are less responsive to such
supplier programs because of past accomplishments vis-
à-vis competition and the adjustment costs of realigning
the distribution system’s inventories. This is particularly
true if the supplier’s product is an insignificant element in
the retailer’s product mix and corresponding strategy.
Moreover, dominant retailers probably would tend to re-
sist direct incentives designed to motivate their employees
(contests and SPIFFs) so as to minimize compromising re-
tailer objectives. Similarly, they would tend to reject offers
of missionary selling and demonstrations, preferring of-
fers from more attractive suppliers.
Incentives that immediately improve the profitability of
the line (inventory financing, billbacks/count-recounts,
slotting allowances) usually are necessary in addition to
strong supplier advertising and consumer promotional ef-
forts. Thus, suppliers are trapped into behavior-inducing,
but not attitude-enhancing, promotions. Anderson and Na-
rus (1990) capture the situation:
Relative dependence is found to be a significant an-
tecedent of influence in the working partnership,
which suggests that a less dependent firm can enact
successfully the various influence strategies. . . . A
more dependent firm, in contrast, should seek ways
to add value (or reduce cost) to the exchange for the
partner firm at a relatively small cost to itself. (P. 56)
Moreover, suppliers with particularly weak horizontal
strength may not receive a positive response from domi-
nant retailers even with above-average trade inducements.
Ultimately, these suppliers may be forced into becoming
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providers of products for private brands, thereby shifting
promotional responsibilities to the retailer.
Increasing interdependency. Another alternative for the
subservient supplier is to attempt to alter the power equa-
tion. Automatic reordering programs, immediate elec-
tronic transfer of sales data to suppliers, and supplier-
developed category management programs are three
illustrations of supplier attempts to improve its com-
petitive position and lessen trade promotion demands
by retailers. These improved channel services add value
or reduce retailer costs, thereby increasing the supplier’s
horizontal strength. Consequently, the supplier becomes
more attractive.
Golden Cat is a good example of a supplier that has
altered its power position through information technology
rather than distribution programming. Golden Cat, mar-
keters of Kitty Litter Maxx and Tidy Cat brands of cat lit-
ter, is a single-category seller in competition with well-
known Fortune 500 packaged goods marketers. Their key
to success is based on providing an effective category man-
agement program. Golden Cat has devoted considerable
resources to efficient consumer response (ECR) programs
in recent years (Liesse 1994). By exchanging sales data
with key retailers, Golden Cat can track daily sales on a
store-by-store basis, thereby allowing it to quickly replen-
ish stock based on how consumers respond to retailers’ in-
store promotions. Retailers enhance their merchandise
turnover by receiving just-in-time deliveries rather than
storing cat litter. In addition, Golden Cat has demonstrated
that fewer SKUs would allow retailers to improve profits
by selling higher margin brands (Liesse 1994).
Strong Symmetric Situation
A strong symmetric situation is one in which the sup-
plier and the retailer are strong and equal in market attrac-
tiveness. A strong national retail chain and a strong
supplier illustrate a strong symmetric relationship. For
their stronger brands and models, Procter & Gamble sell-
ing to Safeway, Mattel to Toys “R” Us, and Sony to Target
Stores are examples of this type of situation. Here, both the
supplier and the retailer recognize each other’s counter-
vailing power. Thus, attempts at profit shifting through
trade promotion activity are not likely to be productive.
Perhaps more important, the mutual attractiveness encour-
ages finding mutually beneficial cooperative ventures.
Proposition 3: Channel partners in strong symmetric re-
lationships should favor trade promotions that
strengthen channel relationships by promoting co-
operation in mutually beneficial activities.
Mutually beneficial trade promotions are those that
promote relationships and enhance consumer demand.
These include display allowances, cooperative advertis-
ing/comarketing programs, missionary selling, and prod-
uct demonstrations. When more than one strong supplier
exists, such as Coke and Pepsi, calendar-marketing agree-
ments are useful because they “manage” the competitive
process by limiting trade and consumer promotions to one
company per calendar period. Because many large retail-
ers prohibit direct employee incentive programs to mini-
mize outside influence that may compromise retailer
objectives, contests and SPIFFs are less preferred options.
Weak Symmetric Situation
A weak symmetric situation is one in which neither the
supplier nor the retailer is strong in market attractiveness.
A small local retailer (such as a local independent super-
market) and a small supplier (such as a local jam and jelly
producer) illustrate a weak symmetric situation. Neither
channel member has much freedom in determining its
marketing programming when dealing with more domi-
nant partners, but there are opportunities with each other.
Proposition 4: Channel partners in weak symmetric rela-
tionships should favor price-oriented trade promo-
tions in an attempt to gain or hold market share.
Placed in a survival mode, channel partners in weak
symmetric relationships are likely to use trade promotions
that result in temporary price cuts that are passed along to
the consumer, giving both supplier and retailer a tempo-
rary price advantage over their more dominant rivals. Bill-
back/count-recount trade promotions are appropriate,
while nonbinding compliance-oriented price promotions
should be resisted. Their common vested interests should
negate a need for distribution enhancing trade promotions
(slotting allowances and inventory financing).
IMPLICATIONS
The typology presented in Figure 3 and the related
research propositions should be tested empirically. Based
on our extrapolations from the market power and trade
promotion literatures, we believe the propositions possess
face validity and will withstand empirical scrutiny. The
data collection will be challenging for academic research-
ers because of the proprietary nature of the needed infor-
mation. Expenditures by trade promotion category by
channel partner characteristics by product/category are
not publicly available. The competitive value of this infor-
mation minimizes the likelihood that companies would
supply it, at least in undisguised format. This highlights
the need for cooperative research efforts between aca-
demic researchers and practitioners on this topic.
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Fundamental to implementing the proposed trade pro-
motion framework is an accurate assessment of supplier
and retailer power. We identified brand/outlet distinctive-
ness, consumer loyalty, competitive position, and category
importance as four origins of market power that are of rele-
vance in selecting trade promotion alternatives. Research
should examine the appropriateness of these four origins,
the interrelationship among the origins, and the effect on
trade promotion policy. Issues such as potential thresh-
olds, compensatory effects, and synergism warrant
investigation.
We further argue that trade promotion activity can
affect future relations with channel partners and can affect
future channel power. The posited outcomes of trade pro-
motion activity need empirical investigation. For example,
we postulate that contests promote retail employee bond-
ing with the supplier. Does this typically occur, does it
require certain types of contests, does the outcome hold for
only particular types of employees, or does the employee
revert to previous behavior once the contest expires? In
addition, our presentation excludes street money, free
goods, and discounts as undesirable trade promotion
options unless tied to a multielement distribution-
programming package in which performance require-
ments can be monitored. It would be worthwhile to explore
whether there are instances in which street money, free
goods, and discounts can stand alone as acceptable
options.
Another important test of these propositions is to assess
their applicability across several industries. The research
question is whether product- or industry-specific charac-
teristics restrict the generalizability of this research. For
example, does the model hold for both low and high tech-
nology industries? Does the model hold equally well in
mature industries versus those that are less mature? We
believe that relative power within these supplier-retailer
dyads will account for these interindustry differences, but
this needs to be studied.
On a more microlevel, the predictive efficacy of the
research typology should be assessed for products of vary-
ing degrees of newness and brand prominence. For exam-
ple, within the supplier-retailer dyads in Figure 3, would
the same trade promotion mix be used for new brands as
for existing brands? Would equivalently powerful suppli-
ers, one using a family-branding strategy and the other
implementing an individual-brand strategy, use approxi-
mately the same trade promotional combinations? In other
words, would brand synergies result in different trade pro-
motion mixes?
A related question is how a supplier or retailer should
respond if a competitor implements a trade promotion pro-
gram that is inconsistent with our typology and proposi-
tions. Would a radical departure from our recommenda-
tions be required to counter this competitor’s actions, or
would these actions be ultimately self-defeating? How
many different mixes of trade promotion programs and
magnitudes can be successful within similar seller-retailer
dyads?
The relationship between retailer assortments and trade
promotions should also be examined. Do supplier trade
promotions influence retailer assortments in the long run?
We expect to see such influence when strong suppliers are
dealing with weak retailers, but we are uncertain if power-
ful retailers would alter assortments to accommodate cer-
tain trade promotions.
When retailers make strategic line-of-trade decisions,
the role of trade promotions will be affected with regard to
some products. For example, do trade promotional pro-
grams for laundry detergent change when Wal-Mart
expands from traditional general merchandise discount
stores to superstores that include a full-line supermarket?
In the traditional Wal-Mart discount store, laundry deter-
gents represent a nonessential product category and, as
such, are not integral to the image and success of the
general-merchandise discount store operation. By con-
trast, in Wal-Mart superstores, consumers expect to find
laundry detergents and other products typically found in
traditional supermarkets. Thus, the market power of sup-
pliers such as Procter & Gamble may increase vis-à-vis
Wal-Mart through increased product category importance
associated with Wal-Mart’s line-of-trade decision.
Finally, two theoretical issues ought to be studied in
greater detail. First, we have proposed that trade promo-
tions influence future power of suppliers and retailers via
feedback links. The existence of these links needs to be
established empirically. A longitudinal study is needed to
confirm the appealing perspective that power accumulates
over time.
Second, the model, for purposes of presentation, has
been reduced to a two-by-two (high and low power)
matrix. Power is likely to be a continuous variable, at least
for some ranges. Additional research is needed to establish
ranges of power and to determine if power is relatively
seamless or if power thresholds are recognizable.
SUMMARY
Channel coordination involves the complex interaction
of economic, social, and governance issues. By recogniz-
ing these issues, trade promotions can be effective in fine-
tuning relations and overcoming hurdles not fully
addressed by ongoing product, price, distribution, and
communication strategies. Understanding that the origins
of market power are based on valued scarce resources
clarifies the degrees of freedom a supplier has in dealing
with its channel partners. More relative power gives a firm
greater discretion in its distribution programming.
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Trade promotions can reallocate channel profits,
increase selective demand, and affect the supplier’s future
market power by affecting its consumer franchise. There-
fore, suppliers should examine the long-term implications
of trade promotions in addition to their short-term results
and judiciously select the appropriate trade promotions for
their strategic position.
We believe that much of the increase in trade promo-
tions over the last decade did not support supplier strate-
gies. The growth in trade promotions was an attempt to
obtain a “quick fix,” and their misuse created serious
long-term strategic problems for many suppliers. We
argue that one reason strategic problems result from the
misuse of trade promotions is that managers lack a theo-
retical framework for trade promotion programming. This
framework should highlight the implementation role of
trade promotions and provide a perspective for selecting
specific trade promotion practices for particular competi-
tive situations.
We have described the trade promotion situation in
detail and have provided a framework that offers guide-
lines for choosing the most appropriate types of promo-
tions. This framework, while requiring empirical testing
through further research, is consistent with the extant lit-
erature on distribution channels and market power. We
hope that it will motivate both suppliers and retailers to
think about important issues relating to inappropriate use
of trade promotions and the consequent erosion of com-
petitive position. Proper implementation of trade promo-
tions using this framework has the potential to enhance a
firm’s competitive advantage.
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